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Abstract
Thanks to the high availability of data, professional sport represents a unique
laboratory in order to test labour market theories and predictions. In par-
ticular, one of the most important propositions concerns the role that hu-
man capital plays in shaping the life-cycle earnings patterns of workers. To
the extent that sport can be considered as a type of human capital invest-
ment, human capital theory can help to understand, and empirically assess,
how the professional sports labour market rewards performance attributes
of players. On this purpose, this piece of work reviews the most important
economic contributions focused on the wage determination of professional
athletes with the aim of outlining both the emerging common features and
the main issues. In so doing, a distinction between professional team-sports
and professional single-player sports is done, where the former is represented
by the most popular sports in North America and Europe, such as baseball,
basketball, hockey and soccer, whereas the latter is primarily represented by
professional golf in the US.
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1 Introduction
It is nearly ascertained that professional sports represents a unique labora-
tory for testing labour market theories. Thanks to the high availability of
individual data, a growing body of research, from the 1950s, focuses on the
characteristics of the sports business sector, as well as the sports labour mar-
ket, with the aim of observing whether economic propositions at least have a
chance of being true. One of this economic propositions particularly concerns
the crucial role that human capital plays in shaping the life-cycle wage pat-
terns of workers. As far as sport can be considered as a typology of human
capital investment, human capital theory can help to understand, and empir-
ically assess, how the sports labour market rewards performance attributes
of athletes. The key question, therefore, is: can sport be considered as a
form of human capital? According to Jacob Mincer, human capital can be
defined as knowledge and skills accumulated through a time-consuming edu-
cation activity (Mincer, 1958). Relying on this definition, the accumulation
of playing skills through physical and on-the-field training can be consid-
ered a form of human capital. Human capital is also an investment in the
sense that it involves expected returns and actual costs - the latter being
represented by direct outlays and foregone consumption - in large measure
implicit in the wage structure. In other words, the wage rate can be viewed
as the rental price of a unit of human capital, and differences in accumulated
human capital can account for a great deal of wage heterogeneity. Human
capital theory deals with acquired abilities and capacities that are developed
through formal and informal education at school and at home, and through
training, experience and mobility in the labour market. Following the same
intuition, sports athletes are individuals endowed with some particular phys-
ical, cognitive and psychomotor abilities. To the extent that the development
of their skills generates, on the one side, earnings benefits and, on the other,
opportunity costs, their activity qualifies as a capital asset in the same sense
as physical capital even if it cannot be sold or bought, but just rented, and
even though investments in such capital often involve non-market activities,
such as training.
As an economic concept, human capital is at least four centuries old , but
its inclusion into the mainstream economic analysis dates back to the late
1950s with the studies of the School of Chicago (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1964;
Schultz, 1963, 1975). Thanks to the availability of data on personal income
distribution, the application of empirical economic research to the US labour
market leads to the abolition of two simplifying assumptions: first, the re-
striction of the concept of capital to merely physical capital; second, the idea
of homogeneity of labour input underlying both the concept of functional
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income distribution and the measurement of labour in manhours. The main
finding is that, at the microeconomic level, differences in individual human
capital stocks are able to explain much of the observed variance in the wage
structure of individuals. On this purpose, Jacob Mincer earnings function
model (Mincer, 1958, 1970) represents a cornerstone of a large literature in
empirical economics. As Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) argue, in one
equation this framework captures two distinct economic aspects: first, an
hedonic wage function that shows how the labour market rewards produc-
tion attributes like schooling and work experience; second, the rate of return
to schooling that can be compared with the market interest rate in order
to determine the optimal human capital investment choice. Under the spe-
cific condition of perfectly competitive labour market, the model specifies an
earning function like the following:
lnW = α0 + α1s+ α2x+ α3x
2 +  (1)
where W represents the individual wage rate, s the schooling level, x the
work experience and  a mean zero error term. The coefficient α1 is the
rate of return to schooling, i.e. the contribution of one additional year of
schooling on the worker future earnings. Coefficients α2 and α3 represent
the marginal impact of work experience on income, the sign of the latter
expected to be negative as reflecting decreasing returns to specialization. In
order to study how the wage of a worker is related to human skills, direct
information on training and work performance attributes are needed. Since
such a kind of data are not readily available, most empirical studies utilize
education, working experience, age and family background as a proxy of in-
dividual productivity. What, instead, marks the sports sector out is the fact
that it offers the opportunity to directly measure specific work performance
on a narrow set of jobs or tasks. On this purpose, from the 1970s, labour
economists concentrate on the estimation of the impact of human skills on
individual earnings and team performance by making an extensive use of
the human capital earning function approach. Aim of this short article is
to briefly outline some common features and issues that, in the last three
decades, have characterized the main contributions based on the wage de-
termination of professional sports athletes. On this purpose, a distinction
among professional team-sports and professional single-player sports will be
done; in particular, the former will be further analyzed with reference to the
most popular sports in North America and Europe, whereas the latter will
be analyzed by referring to professional golf.
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2 Assessing the impact of human skills on
pay and performance of professional ath-
letes: a look at the literature
2.1 The professional baseball labor market
Starting from the seminal contribution of Rottenberg (1956) on team sports
leagues, professional baseball has represented one of the most exploited sec-
tors by sports economists. Studies on this sector, in fact, range from analyses
on property rights and risk sharing to the measurement of managerial ability
and racial discrimination. The first contribution investigating the determi-
nants of professional players’ salary and performance is the article of Scully
(1974), who draws up a way to impute marginal products in the sector of
professional baseball in the US.
Aim of his work is to measure the economic loss that baseball players
suffer because of the restrictions caused by the reserve clause by estimating
the relationship between player predicted marginal revenue product and his
predicted salary. Under the basic assumption that fans attend games in or-
der to see the home-team win, the marginal revenue product is defined as
the ability or performance that one player contributes to the team multiplied
by the effect of that performance on team’s gate receipts. In other terms,
the player performance exerts a twofold effect on the team revenue: a direct
effect on team victories that, in turn, raise gate receipts, and an indirect
effect due to the fact that high-ability athletes are more attractive for fans,
both at the stadium and on television. In order to accommodate these as-
sumptions, Scully develops an empirical model that is characterized by the
following peculiarities:
(i) the unit of observation is the single player;
(ii) the framework is a labour market where salaries are set according to
an extensive bargaining process;
(iii) marginal revenue products are explicitly estimated;
(iv) the difference between the predicted salary and the predicted marginal
revenue product approximates the rate of monopsonistic exploitation
that the reserve clause affords team owners.
In the Scully’s model, teams are engaged in the production of a constant
number of games of a certain quality. The quality of the games is generally
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measured by the team percent wins that, in turn, depends on two inputs:
player skills and non-player skills such as managers’ ability, coach experience,
and team spirit. Team revenues are, thus, defined as:
R = p · T · [WIN(Ai, Ij)] +B · [WIN(Ai, Ij), Pb] (2)
where p is the ticket price, T is the number of tickets sold, WIN is the
percent wins, function of a vector of players’ skills A and a vector of non-
player skills I. The terms B, Pg and Pb, represent, respectively, broadcast
revenues, the number of individuals potentially attracted to the stadium and
potential broadcast households.
In order to estimate the gross marginal revenue product of a player, Scully
adopts a two-step equation approach. First, he estimates how various mea-
sures of player performance affect a team winning percentage; then, he esti-
mates how team revenue is affected by winning percentage, along with other
variables like the size of the labour market, arena capacity, the presence of
black players within the team, and franchise characteristics. The marginal
revenue product is the product of a player’s contribution to percent win times
the impact of winning on team revenue. Scully defines a linear relationship
between percent win and a set of baseball performance variables. First of
all, he divides hitters from pitchers. Then he considers the team slugging
average and the team strikeout-to-walk ratio as a measure of the offensive
and defensive attributes that most affect players’ salaries. Along with these
two variables, three dummies are further specified, two of them reflecting a
measure of high and low team morale and the other one reflecting the fact
of participating to the National League.
Team revenue is estimated as a linear equation which assumes the win per-
cent and other market features as the main regressors. These latter consist
of:
(i) a measure of the magnitude of monopoly income that a team earns for
the fact of signing a franchise contract on an exclusive local area;
(ii) a measure of team-specific attendance at home;
(iii) a measure of the stadium capacity and location;
(iv) a measure of fan racial discrimination represented by the number of
black players in the team.
Finally, in order to obtain net marginal revenue product, additional informa-
tion on team costs is needed. On this purpose, firm specific training, player
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development in addition to other four non-player average costs1 variables are
included in the analysis and subtracted to gross marginal product and team
revenue.
Baseball players’ salaries are determined by defining an earnings function
in which the following set of human skills inputs are identified: hitting or
pitching performance; the weight of players’ contributions to team perfor-
mance; players experience in the major league and the presence of stars and
superstars who usually hold a higher bargaining power (Rosen, 1981). For
hitters, the selected performance measure is the lifetime slugging average,
while, for pitchers, lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio, along with the lifetime
average percentage of innings pitched out on total innings.
Using detailed data on 1968 and 1969 leagues, and comparing gross and
net marginal revenue products with individual salary2, Scully estimates that
the average players, both hitters and pitchers, receive about 20 percent of
their marginal contribution to team revenue while stars only about 15 per-
cent. Only mediocre players seem to get a salary higher than their net
marginal revenue product. Due to the substantial economic losses the re-
serve clause generates for players, the policy implications point in favour of
a higher degree of competition in the professional players labour market, a
suggestion that has been seized in 1975 when the traditional owner’s inter-
pretation of the reserve clause has been relaxed by Peter Seitz decision on
the Andy Messersmith case and players have become free to negotiate their
contracts.
Studies after 1975 utilize the previous model as a benchmark for analyzing
the effects of the new contractual framework on players’ salaries. Sommers
and Quinton (1982) slightly modify Scully’s exercise by considering that, af-
ter 1975, some baseball players have become free agents. Using the same
two-step equation approach, the authors find that, even if average players
may still be grossly underpaid, the first family of free agents receive a salary
that is in line with their marginal revenue product. This finding is not only
due to the competitive bidding, but also by the fact that players may threaten
team owners to become free agents and demand a compensation comparable
to what they would get on the free market.
In line with these results, Scully (1989) finds that, in the 1980s, star players
1Scully obtains non-player cost information from previous studies, in particular on:
(i) team costs including roster and team specific non-player salaries; (ii) game costs of
transportation, equipment, stadium rentals; (iii) general administrative costs of front office
personnel; (iv) sales costs.
2The rate of monopsonistic exploitation is viewed as an upper bound of player exploita-
tion when considering gross marginal revenue product and a lower bound when considering
net marginal revenue product.
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are able to earn a higher percentage (between 30 and 45 percent) of their
marginal revenue product than in the late 1960s, while Zimbalist (1992)
finds that players who are not eligible to become free agents 3 suffer a higher
monopsonistic exploitation (about 38 percent) than their eligible colleagues
(18 percent).
2.2 The cases of hockey and basketball
The relationship between salary and marginal revenue product is investi-
gated with respect to other professional sports and for answering other kind
of research questions. Scott, Long, and Somppi (1985), for instance, analyze
the professional basketball sector with the aim of estimating if players are
overpaid. Using Scully’s approach, they first define a linear production func-
tion in which the dependent variable is the percentage of winnings and the
regressors are home and opponent team performance variables characteristic
of the basketball game: goal shooting percentage, free throw shooting per-
centage, rebounds, assists and fouls. As a second step, they estimate team
revenue with respect to the team win percent, usual market characteristics
and other explanatory variables capturing the number of superstars in the
team and racial discrimination. By comparing the estimation results with
salary information from various newspapers, the authors find that, despite
of their high salaries, players free to sell their services to the highest bidder
are paid more nearly what they are worth, the opposite being true for those
players who are not free agents. The athletes’ exploitation, thus, depends on
the professional sports labour market structure.
An interesting study on how skill differences determine the salary level of
professional players is provided by Jones and Walsh (1988) who focus their
attention on the North American National Hockey League (NHL). Using a
data set on 300 hockey players in 1977-78, matched with salary data from
reports in the press, they define an earnings function in which the natural
logarithm of player salary is regressed against three kinds of variables:
(i) offensive and defensive skills, and physical attributes of skaters and
goaltenders;
(ii) franchise characteristics aimed at capturing the monopolistic structure
of the market, and
3In professional baseball, a player is eligible for free agency after three years of service
in the league.
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(iii) racial discrimination variables, in this case between Anglophone and
French Canadian players.
The OLS estimates reveal some interesting results: first, the market struc-
ture and franchise characteristics do not seem to be so important in affecting
athletes’ compensation; second, all performance skills appear to be highly
significant and, thus, can be considered as prime determinants of salary in
the NHL; third, no empirical support seems to emerge in favour of a racial
discrimination effect against French Canadians.
A slightly different analysis on NHL is the one conducted by Idson and
Kahane (2000), who examine the separate effects of individual and team pro-
ductivity on salary determination. Starting from the recognition that human
capital inputs are complementary in production, the general research ques-
tion is whether individual skills are rewarded differently in different teams, or,
in other words, if a team dynamic exists so to affect individual player salary
and the rate at which individual skills are valued by the team. In order to
distinguish the two effects, two classes of variables are defined: on the one
side, individual player variables concerning experience, career performance,
physical attributes, the status of superstar and the role played within the
team. On the other, team/coach variables such as team revenues and coach
experience and quality.
The main results point to three directions. First, the effect of human
capital on player salary is decomposed as follows: an individual player per-
formance generates a direct and an indirect effect on his salary, the latter
being the positive effect that a good performance has first on the team perfor-
mance. As well as individual skills, team attributes also affect player salary
in a direct and an indirect way, where the latter is given by the effect of the
interaction of team values and player attributes on his compensation. In par-
ticular, higher coaching quality seems to particularly affect player salaries,
and part of the return to individual productive skills is due to the positive
correlation between player productivity and coaching quality and experience.
Second, a problem of omitted variables seems to emerge. If team variables
were not included in the regression analysis, performance coefficient would be
overestimated, as in the case of player experience and seniority, as proxied by
total games played over his career, or in the case of scoring performance, as
given by the career goals and assists per game. Third, it appears that players,
on average, are complements in the production of professional hockey games,
even if such a complementarity is not uniform across all productive attributes.
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2.3 Team-sports labor markets outside North Amer-
ica: the case of European professional soccer
The bulk of studies on sports economics relies on the high availability of
data and case studies on professional team-sports in the US. However, team-
sports diffused outside North-America have been analysed with particular
reference to European countries. Since the 1970s, particular attention has
been devoted to professional football in countries like the United Kingdom
and Italy. One of the first contributions on this field comes from Sloane
(1971), who concentrates on designing the basic features of both professional
soccer industry and soccer clubs as utility maximizer agents4.
More important for the purpose of this paper is the recent contribution
by Lucifora and Simmons (2003), who investigate wage determination among
professional soccer players appearing in the Italian major leagues. Starting
from the widespread feeling on the very high level of Italian soccer players’
earnings, they ask if the relationship between individual productivity and
salary can lead to superstar effects. Following the empirical framework de-
veloped by Rosen (1981), it is possible to test for the existence of superstar
effects on earnings by checking if individual wages are highly convex5 with
respect to player quality and performance measures, after controlling for
personal attributes and team fixed effects. Using performance data coming
from many Italian and European soccer yearbooks along with salary data
from Italian newspapers, the authors specify and estimate a human capital
earnings equation which includes performance, experience, reputation and
team quality variables on Italian players of serie A and B :
lnWi = α0 + α1EXPi + α2PERFi + α3REPi + α4TEAMQj + i (3)
where EXP represents player experience as proxied by age and appear-
ances in the major leagues (serie A and B), PERF a vector of player posi-
tional categories, scoring performance and assists, REP accounts for higher
appearances in international matches and leagues for best performing players
and aims at reducing possible problems of omitted variables, and TEAMQ
measures team-specific effects due to home attendance and coach quality.
Superstar variables are calculated for players achieving more than a defined
threshold rate of goals per game.
4An interesting update about the characteristics of the European, and in particular of
the English, professional soccer industry is also in Szymanski and Smith (1997)
5Convex returns to salary means that each performance indicator x (i.e. career goals
per game) must exhibit a positive second derivative with respect to the wage rate:
∂2wage/∂x2 < 0.
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After controlling for team fixed effects, the results highlight a strong con-
vexity of player salary across two performance measures: career goal scoring
and the assist rate, particularly for forward and midfield players. This evi-
dence is used to support the existence of superstar effects in the Italian soccer
leagues, as primarily generated by consumer interest in forward play.
2.4 Sigle-player sports labor markets: the case of US
professional golf
The impact of playing skills on individual salary is mainly investigated by
referring to team-sports labour markets. Very few studies are oriented, in-
stead, towards non-team, or single-player, sports. One exception is the paper
by Shmanske (2000), who studies the ’skill-earnings’ relationship by gender
on the Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) 1999 Tour and on the Ladies
Professional Golf Association (LPGA) official 1999 Tour. After identifying
the main skills that affect professional golfers compensations, the regression
equations for the PGA Tour and the LPGA Tour are first run separately and
then combined. The main human capital variables concern the four types
of strokes that characterize golf games. The first stroke is called ’the drive’,
and the two variables associated are the distance that the golfer averages on
his/her drive and the percentage of the time the drive ends up in the fairway;
the second is called the ’approach shot’, and the variable which captures the
relative skill is the percentage of time that the player achieves this result; the
third is the ’bunker’, and the skills measured is given by the percentage of
times that the golfer is able to recover and make par. Finally, the last shot
is the ’putting’, and the total number of putts taken on the green during
a round is the variable associated. Instead of traditional salary indicators,
earnings per tournament are predicted on the previous five skill variables
both for men and for women.
The results of the regressions stress two findings: first, it is possible to
identify which specific skills are most valued for men and women respectively.
In particular, ’putting’ and ’driving distance’ seem to be the most important
for men, while ’putting’ and ’approaching in regulation’ for women. Second,
professional golf industry seems to reward the absolute level of skill with no
gender bias. In fact, by combining data on men and women, if, on the one
side, it is true that the former are paid more in the PGA Tour than women,
on the other side, it is also true that the latter are paid more in LPGA Tour
than they would in the PGA Tour. In other words, once skill levels are ac-
counted for, women are not underpaid compared to men.
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3 Concluding remarks: strengths, trends and
issues emerging from the literature
The analysis of the literature engaged in estimating the impact of human cap-
ital on sports athletes compensation leads to identify some common features
and trends as well as some open questions and issues. Table 1 summarizes
what follows.
Common traits can be sketched in four directions. The first concerns the
empirical framework adopted. The use of the earnings function approach is
one of the most exploited tools in labour economics. When applied to pro-
fessional sports, it is particularly powerful in estimating the marginal impact
of human capital variables on individual player salary. The identification of
such variables depends on the knowledge of the rules of the sports involved
in the analysis. In any case, professional sports represent a fruitful context
where such an approach can be utilized since data on individual skills and
wages are available and observable, the structure of the market is usually
clear, and the production function (the game) of teams and players is well
known and standardized.
The second line concerns the common methodology for the marginal rev-
enue product estimation. In line with Scully (1974), a two-step equation
approach is used under the basic assumption that fans are attracted to the
stadium, or to watch TV, in order to see the home-team win. Assuming
again perfect knowledge of the rules of the game, this approach consists in
determining, at first, the impact that skills exert on team performance, and,
at a second stage, the impact that team performance has on each player
salary.
The context or the field of application is the third common feature. The
major part of the literature, in fact, is focused on North American profes-
sional team-sports, such as baseball, basketball, and hockey, with few ex-
ceptions on golf and European soccer. North American major leagues are
commonly characterized by:
(i) the presence, up to 1975, of a high degree of monopsonistic exploitation
due to a team owner-biased interpretation of the reserve clause;
(ii) the progressive diffusion of free agent players after 1975;
(iii) the strong stability of leagues due to a lack of teams turnover year after
year; (iv) high availability of data on both performance and salary.
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The fourth route is represented by data. Performance and human skills in-
formation usually come from statistical yearbooks and reports developed by
sports associations and federations, while salary data are usually reported
in reports from the press and newspapers, with a quite satisfactory level of
detail.
Finally, the last route concerns findings. Four kinds of trends seem to
characterize North American team sports:
(i) the more the sports labour market is competitive, the lower is the degree
of monopsonistic exploitation and the more players are paid what they
capable to do;
(ii) skills plays a crucial role both in shaping player salaries and perfor-
mance and in reducing gender and racial discrimination;
(iii) local market attributes do not seem to be so important in determining
athletes wages, but they seem more important as control variables;
(iv) results on gender bias and fan racial discrimination are not unambigu-
ous, and crucially depends on white/black and men/women players
relative skills.
The same approach can be used in order to underline the main issues and
open questions. On the empirical framework adopted, the first issue concerns
the nature and composition of player salary: in fact, almost all the contri-
butions examined rely on gross annual salary data. However, players salary
is usually determined by two or three components: a gross annual salary
plus possible gross individual benefits coming from advertising or other ini-
tiatives and/or possible gross collective benefits. Even if data on these latter
components are not easy to find, the inclusion of complementary forms of
athletes compensation can have a threefold effect: first, it may offer the op-
portunity for a more complete and realistic analysis; second, since benefits
greatly differ across players and teams, it may increase the degree of variance
among player salaries; third, it may represent a direct and suitable measure
for testing superstar effects.
Looking at salary again, another emerging issue is that some players can
play for more than one team within a single year. Since salary data are not
available for the player for each team he plays with, the comparison between
multiple movers is tenuous and the information available on individual salary
may be biased or may represent a much more ’stable’ remunerative situation
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than it really is.
On the methodological side, the main issue concerns the possibility to bet-
ter measure players marginal revenue product. As noted by Kahn (2000), the
findings on monopsonistic exploitation must be interpreted cautiously, since
players are supposed to affect teams revenues only through their own playing
statistics on winning percentage. Other effects are not captured by the rev-
enues of the player’s home team, such as the effects on attendance on away
games, TV ratings and merchandise sales. In addition, a more complete and
correct measure of athletes superstar status must be explored, for instance
by considering players citations in reports of sports matches, sales of named
replica shirts, the appearances and experience in international competitions
and so on.
A third open question emerges with respect to the context of analysis.
Actually the major part of the research effort is devoted to professional
team-sports developed in North America, mainly in the US. However, at
least three other fields of analysis still remains open for future research: first,
team-sports in other countries, like, for instance, Europe, Latin America and
Asia. This kind of studies may provide useful cross-country information, and
can contribute to define and include ’country-specific’ effects in the earnings
function regressions developed by the mainstream approach. Second, single-
player professional sports, in which no team-specific effects exist, like golf,
tennis and boxing, or in which a team exists and plays as a support for the
individual athlete performance, such as motor-racing and cycling. Third,
non-professional or amateur sports, in which motivations other than profits
and salary determine the people choice to practice sports activities.
Finally, the sources and the quality of data represent the last and major
issue. Professional sports is ascertained to be a sector characterized by a
high availability of data, both on performance and on salary. However, it
is worth to underline that such availability on sportsmen’s earnings is much
more limited in Europe relative to North America. Soccer, for instance, that
is the most popular sport in Europe, is a much more interactive game than
baseball or basketball, so that isolating superstar effects for European soccer
is a more challenging task than for some North American sports. In addition,
salary data usually come from newspapers and press reports: however good
and detailed this information can be, official statistical reports and/or sur-
veys based on ad-hoc questionnaires and subjected to more accurate controls
are needed. In addiction, salary data on team training costs are particu-
larly welcome, not only to improve the analyses on players marginal revenue
product, but also for answering some questions on the employability of young
players in the first team squads.
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